Benefiting From Misfortune: When Harmless Actions Are Judged to Be Morally Blameworthy by Inbar, Yoel et al.
University of Pennsylvania
ScholarlyCommons
Finance Papers Wharton Faculty Research
2012
Benefiting From Misfortune: When Harmless
Actions Are Judged to Be Morally Blameworthy
Yoel Inbar
David A. Pizarro
Fiery Cushman
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.upenn.edu/fnce_papers
Part of the Finance and Financial Management Commons, and the Social and Behavioral
Sciences Commons
This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. http://repository.upenn.edu/fnce_papers/72
For more information, please contact repository@pobox.upenn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Inbar, Y., Pizarro, D. A., & Cushman, F. (2012). Benefiting From Misfortune: When Harmless Actions Are Judged to Be Morally
Blameworthy. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 38 (1), 52-62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0146167211430232
Benefiting From Misfortune: When Harmless Actions Are Judged to Be
Morally Blameworthy
Abstract
Dominant theories of moral blame require an individual to have caused or intended harm. However, the
current four studies demonstrate cases where no harm is caused or intended, yet individuals are nonetheless
deemed worthy of blame. Specifically, individuals are judged to be blameworthy when they engage in actions
that enable them to benefit from another’s misfortune (e.g., betting that a company’s stock will decline or that
a natural disaster will occur). Evidence is presented suggesting that perceptions of the actor’s wicked desires are
responsible for this phenomenon. It is argued that these results are consistent with a growing literature
demonstrating that moral judgments are often the product of evaluations of character in addition to
evaluations of acts.
Disciplines
Finance and Financial Management | Social and Behavioral Sciences
This journal article is available at ScholarlyCommons: http://repository.upenn.edu/fnce_papers/72
See	discussions,	stats,	and	author	profiles	for	this	publication	at:	https://www.researchgate.net/publication/51979245
Benefiting	From	Misfortune	When	Harmless
Actions	Are	Judged	to	Be	Morally	Blameworthy
Article		in		Personality	and	Social	Psychology	Bulletin	·	January	2012
DOI:	10.1177/0146167211430232	·	Source:	PubMed
CITATIONS
50
READS
180
3	authors,	including:
Yoel	Inbar
Tilburg	University
25	PUBLICATIONS			993	CITATIONS			
SEE	PROFILE
David	A	Pizarro
Cornell	University
57	PUBLICATIONS			2,879	CITATIONS			
SEE	PROFILE
All	content	following	this	page	was	uploaded	by	Yoel	Inbar	on	23	August	2017.
The	user	has	requested	enhancement	of	the	downloaded	file.
In press: Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin                                  BENEFITING FROM MISFORTUNE 1 
Benefiting from misfortune:  
When harmless actions are judged to be morally blameworthy 
 
Yoel Inbar, David Pizarro, Fiery Cushman 
 
Dominant theories of moral blame require an individual to have caused or intended harm. However, across 
four studies we demonstrate cases where no harm is caused or intended, yet individuals are nonetheless 
deemed worthy of blame.  Specifically, individuals are judged to be blameworthy when they engage in actions 
that enable them to benefit from another’s misfortune (for example, betting that a company’s stock will 
decline or that a natural disaster will occur). We present evidence suggesting that perceptions of the actor’s 
wicked desires are responsible for this phenomenon. We argue that these results are consistent with a growing 
literature demonstrating that moral judgments are often the product of evaluations of character in addition to 
evaluations of acts. 
 
The concept of blameworthy action is central 
both to the law (Hall, 1947) and to moral 
judgment (Weiner, 1995). A blameworthy 
action—a behavior that is “morally wrong or 
socially opprobrious” (Alicke, 2000)—is a 
prerequisite for moral condemnation and most 
legal punishment, and so being found 
blameworthy can have serious consequences, from 
social exclusion to imprisonment. But by what 
process do we determine that an action is worthy 
of blame?  
This question has received a great deal of 
attention from philosophers (e.g., Austin, 1956; 
Feinberg, 1968; Hart, 1968; Hart & Honore, 1959) 
and psychologists (Darley & Zanna, 1982; Shultz 
& Schleifer, 1983; Shultz, Schleifer, & Altman, 
1981; Shaver, 1985; Weiner, 1995), who have 
developed normative and descriptive accounts of 
how and why we blame. According to these 
theories, the prototypical blameworthy action is 
one where an agent causes harm to another, and 
does so intentionally (Shaver, 1985). While blame 
may also be ascribed to a lesser degree when either 
factor is present alone—people sometimes 
consider it blameworthy to cause harm even 
accidentally (Alicke, 1992), or to perform an act 
intended to harm another even if it fails 
(Cushman, 2008)—these theories of responsibility 
predict than an action will not be judged 
blameworthy if it involves neither harmful intent 
nor causal responsibility for a harmful outcome. 
Yet there appear to be actions that are 
considered blameworthy even if they neither cause 
harm nor are performed with harmful intent. 
Consider, for example, the behavior of Greg 
Lippmann, a trader at Deutsche Bank who advised 
investors to bet on mortgage defaults. Lippmann’s 
strategy was to purchase financial instruments that 
were linked to a pool of mortgages and that would 
became far more valuable if those mortgages went 
into default (i.e., if individual homeowners were 
unable to make the payments on their homes).  Of 
course, Lippman’s bet did not (and could not) 
cause the subprime mortgage crisis to occur. 
Neither did Lippman intend for his bet to cause a 
crisis. He merely sought to benefit from a tragic 
event that he knew to be beyond his control. 
From the perspective of the theories described 
earlier there is no basis on which to judge actions 
like Lippman’s blameworthy, and yet the 
widespread public outcry against “short sellers” 
who engage in similar behavior suggests that 
people commonly do so. Why might this be the 
case? 
We propose that one reason such actions may 
be deemed blameworthy is that individuals 
consider a person’s desires as a target of moral 
evaluation, particularly when there is a desire for 
something harmful to occur. It is reasonable to 
infer that when someone is in a position to gain 
from an event, this produces an increased desire 
for it to occur.  For instance, people who buy a 
lottery ticket likely desire that their winning 
numbers be drawn, and gamblers at a racetrack 
generally prefer that their horse win. Similarly, an 
investor who stands to benefit if homeowners are 
unable to pay their mortgages can be assumed to 
desire widespread defaults.  We suggest that 
ordinary people consider it bad to desire 
widespread mortgage defaults (or, more generally, 
to desire that harm befall other people—what we 
refer to as a “wicked desire”).  
It is likely the case that people evaluate the 
character of a person who possesses such wicked 
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desires more negatively—this would be consistent 
with a great deal of previous research 
demonstrating that desires and preferences 
influence judgments of an individual’s underlying 
traits and dispositions (Funder, 2004). However, 
we suggest that information about an agent’s 
desires may play a role not just in the assessment 
of an individual’s underlying moral character, but 
in the moral evaluation of the actions themselves. 
Specifically, we suggest that people may consider 
it morally wrong for an agent to engage in any 
action that engenders a wicked desire. For 
instance, the reason Lippman may seem especially 
blameworthy for performing an action with no 
direct intention to harm nor that caused any harm 
is because the act of hedging against mortgages 
caused Lippman to root for the suffering of 
homeowners—a desire that likely did not exist 
before this action. An act may be deemed 
blameworthy, then, if it causes a person to adopt 
wicked desires.   
The notion that desires play an important role 
in moral evaluation is not a new one. We know, 
for instance, that an action is judged more wrong 
and blameworthy when the agent desires to cause 
harm (Cushman, 2008; Pizarro, Uhlman, & 
Salovey, 2003; Woolfolk, Doris & Darley, 2006). 
However, “desire” in this sense is more centrally 
tied to the notion of intent, and as such plays a 
role that is perfectly consistent with standard 
models of moral blame, on which intent to cause 
harm is a critical feature of a blameworthy action. 
What is unusual about the case of betting on 
mortgage defaults is that the action (an 
investment) is not performed with the desire to 
cause harm, but merely with the hope of profiting 
from a harm that is likely to occur (for entirely 
independent reasons).  Our prediction is that 
people may find it morally objectionable to engage 
in a behavior like betting on harm, not because the 
act causes harm, but rather because the actor is 
putting him or herself in a position to root for the 
harm to occur.  
In the experiments that follow, we test this 
“wicked desires” account by examining people’s 
moral judgments of harmless acts in which an 
individual benefits from the misfortune of others. 
In Study 1, we examine whether people do indeed 
judge such acts as blameworthy. In Studies 2-4, we 
test whether these judgments were explained by 
the wicked desires account outlined above, while also 
attempting to rule out alternative explanations. 
Study 1 
 
In Study 1 we tested whether people would 
judge harmless acts as blameworthy if these acts 
allowed an individual to benefit from another’s 
misfortune. To do so, we created a scenario that 
conceptually paralleled the example described 
above (betting against the U.S. mortgage market). 
However, rather than using the emergence of a 
financial crisis as the harm from which an agent 
might benefit, we chose the occurrence of a 
natural disaster (i.e., an earthquake in a developing 
nation) because we assumed that, while 
participants might believe that financial bets could 
cause a financial crisis, they would not believe that 
financial bets could cause a natural disaster. 
Specifically, the scenario described a fund manager 
at a financial firm who invested in “catastrophe 
bonds,” which were described as gaining in value 
either if an earthquake struck a certain developing 
country (harm condition) or if an earthquake did 
not strike the country (no harm condition). Thus, 
receiving a payoff in the harm condition was an 
instance of benefitting from a misfortune, whereas 
a payoff in the no harm condition was not.  
In addition to asking participants about their 
judgments of blameworthiness of the fund 
manager’s actions, we asked participants to make 
judgments about his overall character. This 
allowed us to test whether moral blame for 
benefitting from misfortune is simply a result of 
negative assessments of an individual’s moral 
character. 
 
Participants and Design 
 
The study was administered online to 97 
individuals recruited and paid via Amazon.com’s 
Mechanical Turk web service (Paolacci, Chandler, 
& Ipeirotis, 2010).1 All participants read a scenario 
describing Mr. Green, “a money manager at a 
large financial firm,” who had decided to invest 
one of his funds in “catastrophe bonds.” 
Participants randomly assigned to the harm 
condition (n = 60) read that the bonds were 
“worth little unless a severe earthquake strikes a 
certain third world country in the next two years” 
and that “[s]ure enough, an earthquake strikes, 
causing great devastation, and the bonds become 
very valuable.” Participants assigned to the no harm 
condition (n = 37), read that the bonds gained 
value “as long as a certain third world country is 
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NOT struck by an earthquake in the next two 
years,” and that “[s]ure enough, there is no 
earthquake and the bonds become very valuable.” 
Participants then completed two items 
assessing the blameworthiness of Mr. Green’s 
actions: “Do you think what Mr. Green did was 
morally wrong” from 1 (Not wrong at all) to 9 (Very 
wrong); and “To what extent should Mr. Green be 
morally blamed for his action” from 1 (Not blamed 
at all) to 9 (Blamed very much). Participants also 
completed two questions about Mr. Green’s 
global character: “Do you think that Mr. Green is 
mainly a good person or a bad person?” from 1 
(Mainly a bad person) to 9 (Mainly a good person); and 
“Do you think that Mr. Green has good moral 
standards?” from 1 (Not at all) to 9 (Completely). 
Finally, in order to assess whether the effect of the 
manipulation was moderated by how much 
experience participants’ had with financial 
investments, we asked participants to indicate 
their investment experience on a scale from 1 
(Very little) to 9 (A great deal). In order to minimize 
the length of the study, we did not collect 
demographic information. 
 
Results and Discussion 
 
As the item assessing investment experience 
did not moderate the results we will not discuss it 
further. 
Because responses to the two action 
judgments (r = .86, p < .0001) and the two 
character judgments (r = .70, p < .0001) were 
highly correlated, we combined the first two items 
into a blameworthiness composite and the latter two 
items into a character composite. The two 
composites correlated significantly, r = -.51, p < 
.0001. 
As predicted, participants viewed the money 
manager’s actions as more blameworthy when he 
benefited from harm, as indicated by the 
blameworthiness composite scores across 
conditions: Mharm = 4.33, Mno harm = 2.35, t(95) = 
4.15, p < .0001, d = .85. Participants also saw the 
money manager’s character as worse when he 
benefited from harm, as indicated by scores on the 
character composite across conditions: Mharm = 
4.84, Mno harm = 5.99, t(95) = 3.55, p = .0006, d = 
.73. However, an ANCOVA on blameworthiness 
controlling for character judgments still showed a 
significant effect of condition, F(1, 94) = 7.31, p = 
.008. 
As predicted, participants saw an action that 
benefited from harm as more blameworthy than 
an otherwise identical action that did not, even 
when controlling for negative assessments of the 
actor’s character. These results provide the first 
evidence that people find benefiting from harm to 
be morally blameworthy, and that this is not 
simply a result of a greater willingness to blame 
individuals who are seen as having bad character. 
This was despite the fact that participants were 
unlikely to assume that the harm (an earthquake) 
could have been caused by the action (purchasing 
a bond). 
 
Study 2 
 
Study 1 demonstrated that individuals who 
benefit from harms that they neither cause nor 
intend to cause are nonetheless judged to be 
morally blameworthy. Study 2 tests plausible 
alternative explanations for this pattern of results. 
For instance, it may be that the negative affect 
resulting from reading about a harmful event (e.g., 
a natural disaster) might give rise to a greater 
overall willingness to ascribe blame. Just as people 
are more likely ascribe blame when they are 
feeling angry (even if the anger is elicited by an 
unrelated task; Goldberg, Lerner, & Tetlock, 
1999), participants in our study may have been 
more likely to make judgments of blame when 
reading about a misfortune, even when the 
individual being judged bore no causal 
responsibility for having brought about the event 
(we will call this the scapegoating account).  A 
number of studies demonstrate “belief in a just 
world,” according to which individuals are blamed 
for bad things that happen to them (Lerner, 1980).  
By analogy, participants in our study may have 
blamed bad individuals for bad things that 
happened to others. In the present experiment we 
attempted to rule out this alternative explanation. 
Participants were asked to make judgments 
about a stock investor who took either a short 
position (i.e., betting that a stock would go 
decrease in value) or a long position (i.e., betting 
that a stock would increase in value). In addition, 
we manipulated whether the stock was described 
as actually increasing or decreasing in value. We 
hypothesized that as in Study 1 individuals would 
make more negative evaluations of the investor 
who stood to profit from the misfortune of others 
(by “shorting” the stock). Moreover, we included 
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information about whether the stock increased or 
decreased in order to test two competing 
explanations for this effect. Specifically, we 
reasoned that if people view such actions as 
morally objectionable because they signal an 
underlying desire for harm to come about (the 
wicked desires account), participants should find 
the action objectionable regardless of the stock’s 
actual performance. On the other hand, if reading 
about a negative outcome simply makes people 
more willing to blame (the scapegoating account), 
individuals would not find the short-selling 
objectionable if the negative outcome did not 
obtain. 
 
Participants and Design 
 
The study was administered online to 200 U.S. 
adults (114 female; ages 19-86; Mage = 35, SDage = 
12.27) who were recruited and paid via 
Amazon.com’s Mechanical Turk web service 
(Paolacci, Chandler, & Ipeirotis, 2010). All 
participants read about Mr. Brown, a wealthy 
investor who took a long or a short position on the 
stock of Widgetron, Inc. One group (the up 
condition) read that Widgetron’s stock increased 
from $15 to $25; the other (the down condition) 
read that Widgetron’s stock decreased from $15 to 
$5. Finally, participants were randomly assigned to 
read that Mr. Brown either made or lost “several 
million dollars” on his investment (whether Mr. 
Brown was described as making or losing money 
depended, of course, on whether he had correctly 
anticipated whether the stock’s price would rise or 
fall). Participants then completed the same items 
used in Study 1: two items assessing the 
blameworthiness of Mr. Brown’s actions, two 
items assessing his overall character, and one item 
assessing participants’ investment experience (as in 
Study 1, this item did not moderate any results, so 
we do not discuss it further). 
 
Results and Discussion 
 
As in Study 1, we constructed a blameworthiness 
composite and a character composite by combining 
responses to the two action judgments (r = .87, p 
< .0001) and the two character judgments (r = .60, 
p < .0001). The two composites correlated 
significantly, r = -.30, p < .0001. 
Replicating the effect found in Study 1, a 2 
(investment: short vs. long), x 2 (outcome: stock up 
vs. stock down) ANOVA on blameworthiness 
judgments showed that taking a short position was 
seen as more blameworthy than taking a long 
position, Mshort =3.68, Mlong = 2.55, F(1, 196) = 
12.79, p < .001. Supporting the wicked desires 
account, the actual outcome (whether the stock 
actually increased or decreased in price) had no 
effect on blameworthiness judgments (nor did the 
interaction between outcome and investment; 
both ps > .40). A planned contrast comparing the 
short/stock up with the short/stock down condition 
showed no significant difference, F(1, 196) = .19, 
ns. 
A parallel analysis examining character 
composite scores again showed a significant effect 
of investment (and replicated the results of Study 
1): participants saw the investor’s character as 
worse when he took a short position, Mshort =5.35, 
Mlong = 5.75, F(1, 196) = 4.14, p = .04. However, 
as in Study 1, an ANCOVA on blameworthiness 
judgments controlling for character judgments still 
showed a significant effect of taking a short vs. a 
long position, F(1, 195) = 9.59, p = .002.  
As in Study 1, participants judged actions that 
produced a desire for harm to be more 
blameworthy than otherwise identical actions that 
did not, and correspondingly judged individuals 
more harshly for the first type of action than the 
second. Also as in Study 1, blame for these actions 
did not depend on negative character judgments: 
An investor was blamed more for taking a short 
than a long position even controlling for 
assessments of his character.  
Contrary to the scapegoating account (which 
would predict an indiscriminate increase in blame 
when a negative outcome obtains), these results 
demonstrate that the presence of actual harm (or 
benefit) is not necessary for this effect to occur—
participants judged even the attempt to benefit 
from harm as blameworthy. Rather, people seem 
to be willing to condemn mere attempts to benefit 
from harm, even when these attempts are 
unsuccessful. 
 
Study 3 
 
Studies 1 and 2 demonstrated that people find 
benefiting from harm—or even the attempt to do 
so—to be morally blameworthy. While Study 2 
allowed us to rule out the scapegoating account to 
explain this effect, we have not yet shown direct 
evidence for the wicked desires account—that 
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people see benefiting from harm to be 
blameworthy because it reflects a desire for a bad 
outcome to occur. We conducted Study 3 in order 
to provide more direct evidence for the wicked 
desires account, as well as to rule out another 
alternative explanation: that those who benefit 
from harm are seen as “magically” having caused a 
harmful outcome. While at first glance such a 
belief seems implausible among educated 
undergraduates, there is no lack of evidence that 
even well-educated undergraduates commonly 
harbor a variety of magical beliefs (Risen & 
Gilovich, 2008; Rozin & Nemeroff, 2002). Most 
relevant to the current research, Pronin and 
colleagues (2006) have shown that people 
sometimes believe that they have caused a desired 
outcome even when there is no way that they 
could have done so. For example, participants 
who performed a symbolic act of harm (a 
“voodoo hex”) directed at a disliked confederate 
(whom the participants presumably wanted to 
harm) felt more responsible for the confederate’s 
subsequent symptoms of physical illness than did 
those who targeted a neutral confederate. It may 
be that this is why participants in our studies judge 
these acts to be blameworthy—because they 
believe that desiring harm may in some way cause 
an increased chance that the harm will actually 
occur, and therefore those who desire harm bear 
causal responsibility for the outcome (we call this 
the magical thinking account). 
In the current study we used the same 
scenario as in Study 1 (the catastrophe bond). 
Some participants read that the firm’s profits were 
contingent on a good or bad outcome, whereas 
others read that the firm’s profits were non-
contingent on the outcome (i.e., the firm made a 
profit regardless of the outcome). We reasoned 
that in the contingent cases, participants would infer 
that the fund manager’s behavior would produce a 
desire for harm because his profit would be 
contingent on harm. In the non-contingent cases, 
however, participants would be less likely to infer 
that the fund manager’s behavior would produce a 
desire for harm because his profit would be 
identical whether or not the harm occurred. If the 
wicked desires account holds, individuals in this 
condition should be seen as less blameworthy for 
the same action (purchasing bonds that pay off in 
case of disaster).  
As an additional method for distinguishing 
between these explanations we asked participants 
directly about their perceptions of the fund 
manager’s desires. In addition, in order to test the 
possibility that participants held the belief that 
these desires might have a causal influence over 
the outcome, we also asked participants to report 
how much control the fund manager had over the 
outcome. Because participants’ investment 
experience failed to moderate the results of the 
previous experiments, we did not assess it here. In 
order to minimize the length of the study, we also 
did not collect demographic information. 
 
Participants and Design 
 
The study was administered online to 116 U.S. 
adults, who were recruited and paid via 
Amazon.com’s Mechanical Turk web service 
(Paolacci, Chandler, & Ipeirotis, 2010). 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of 
four conditions in a 2 (investment: harm vs. no 
harm) x 2 (profit: contingent profit vs. non-contingent 
profit) between-subjects design. All participants 
read about Mr. Green, “a money manager at a 
large financial firm,” who decides to invest one of 
his funds heavily in “catastrophe bonds.” In the 
harm condition, the bonds were described as 
“worth little unless a severe hurricane strikes a 
certain third world country in the next two years, 
in which case they gain value.” In the no harm 
condition, they were described as “worth little 
unless a certain third world country is NOT struck 
by a hurricane in the next two years, in which case 
they gain value.” 
In the contingent profit conditions, no additional 
information about Mr. Green’s investment was 
provided. However, in the non-contingent profit 
conditions, Mr. Green was described as 
discovering that “many of his firm's investments 
in a certain third world country would lose a great 
deal of value [if a severe hurricane were to 
strike/unless a severe hurricane were to strike] in 
the next two years.” Mr. Green purchases the 
catastrophe bonds in order to protect the firm 
against this possibility, so that “whether Mr. 
Green’s firm makes money is not affected by 
whether a hurricane strikes.” No outcome 
information (i.e., whether a hurricane struck) was 
given (see Appendix A for the full text of the 
scenarios). 
Next, we assessed participants’ perceptions of 
Mr. Green’s desires and control over the outcome 
by asking them to indicate, on 9-point scales 
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anchored by Totally disagree and Totally agree, how 
much they agreed that “Mr. Green was hoping a 
hurricane would strike the third world country;” 
“Mr. Green wanted a hurricane to strike the third 
world country;” “Somehow, Mr. Green affected 
what would happen to the third world country;” 
and “Mr. Green’s behavior changed the likelihood 
that a hurricane would strike the third world 
country.” These questions were presented in 
random order. Participants then completed the 
same four evaluation items used in the previous 
studies: two assessing the blameworthiness of Mr. 
Green’s actions and two assessing evaluations of 
his overall character. 
 
Results and Discussion 
 
We first examined whether our manipulation 
of motive had the expected effect on perceptions 
desires. Responses to the two “desire” items 
(“hoping a hurricane would strike” and “wanted a 
hurricane to strike”) were highly correlated, r(116) 
= .93, p < .0001, and were therefore combined 
into a single composite. A 2 (investment: harm vs. 
no harm) x 2 (profit: contingent vs. non-contingent) 
ANOVA on this composite showed a significant 
interaction, F(1, 112) = 84.65, p < .001. Follow-up 
tests showed that the profit manipulation had the 
expected effect on perceptions of desires: In the 
contingent profit condition, Mr. Green was seen as 
much more desirous of a hurricane when he had 
bought bonds that paid off in the event of a 
hurricane strike: Mharm = 7.35, Mno harm = 1.20, 
t(112) = 14.15, p < .0001. In the non-contingent profit 
condition, Mr. Green’s perceived desires were not 
judged differentially according to the kind of 
bonds he had bought, Mharm = 2.72, Mno harm = 2.92, 
t(112) = .39, ns (see Figure 1). 
We next examined participants’ evaluations of 
the blameworthiness of Mr. Green’s actions. As in 
previous experiments, the two blameworthiness 
items were highly correlated (r = .87, p < .0001) 
and were combined into a composite. 
A 2 (investment: harm vs. no harm) x 2 (profit: 
contingent vs. non-contingent) ANOVA on 
blameworthiness judgments showed a significant 
interaction, F(1, 112) = 6.94, p = .01  (see Figure 
1). Follow-up tests (Tukey’s HSD) showed that 
the interaction was due to greater condemnation 
of Mr. Green’s behavior in the harm/contingent profit 
condition (M = 4.78), which was significantly 
higher than in the other three conditions (all ps < 
.05). None of the other three conditions differed 
significantly from each other, Mharm/non-contingent profit = 
2.26, Mno harm/non-contingent profit = 2.45, Mno harm/contingent profit = 
2.76. Repeating these tests with a composite of the 
two character items (r = .84, p < .001) as a 
covariate showed that blameworthiness judgments 
remained significantly higher in the harm/contingent 
profit condition than in each of the other three 
conditions (all ps < .05), which did not differ 
significantly from each other. 
We next tested our causal model by examining 
whether perceptions of Mr. Green’s desires 
mediated the interactive effects of investment and 
profit on blame. We first tested whether the 
desires composite predicted blame for his actions. 
It did, ! = .45, t(114) = 5.39, p < .0001. Next, we 
regressed action evaluations on the desires 
composite, investment condition, profit condition, 
and the investment x profit interaction. Perceived 
desires continued to predict action evaluations, ! 
= .36, t(111) = 2.55, p = .01, but the investment x 
profit interaction was no longer a significant 
predictor, ! = .04, t(111) = .36, ns. A Sobel test 
confirmed that this drop was significant, 
indicating full mediation, Z = 2.46, p = .014.  
Finally, we examined whether perceptions of 
Mr. Green’s control over the outcome (i.e., 
magical thinking) mediated evaluations of his 
actions. The two control items (“Somehow, Mr. 
Green affected what would happen to the third 
world country” and “Mr. Green’s behavior 
changed the likelihood that a hurricane would 
strike the third world country”) were only 
moderately correlated, r = .30, p = .001. Separately 
examining correlations between each of the 
control items and the blameworthiness evaluations 
showed that judgments of blame were marginally 
correlated with the “changed likelihood” item, 
r(116) = .16, p = .09, and significantly correlated 
with the “affected what would happen” item, 
r(116) = .20, p = .03 (no other correlations were 
significant, all rs < .12). However, neither control 
item was affected by investment, profit, or their 
interaction, all ts < 1.2, all ps > .25. Thus, it does 
not appear that our participants regarded 
benefiting from harm as blameworthy because of 
a “magical” belief that desires can cause harmful 
outcomes. 
The results of the current study buttress the 
results of Studies 1 and 2: Again, participants 
viewed attempts to benefit from harm as 
blameworthy, even when controlling for negative 
In press: Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin                                  BENEFITING FROM MISFORTUNE 7 
evaluations of the actor’s character. However, the 
current results go beyond the previous findings by 
showing that these evaluations are mediated by 
perceived desire for a harmful outcome: When 
there was no reason to believe that Mr. Green 
wanted the harmful outcome to occur (because he 
would profit both if it took place and if it did not) 
his attempt to benefit from harm was not seen as 
blameworthy. Moreover, perceptions of Mr. 
Green’s desires for a harmful outcome mediated 
condemnation of his actions, lending further 
support for the “wicked desires” account. 
Additionally, the results of the current study 
are inconsistent with the several proposed 
alternative explanations of the phenomenon. 
Because no outcome information was provided, 
the scapegoating account would predict no 
condemnation of mere attempts to benefit from 
harm. In addition, the two items included to assess 
whether participants thought that Mr. Green 
possessed control over a desired outcome did not 
differ across our experimental conditions, a result 
that is inconsistent with the magical thinking 
explanation.   
 
Study 4 
 
Studies 1-3 demonstrate that individuals are 
judged to be morally blameworthy when they 
position themselves to benefit from harm, which 
is mediated by perceptions of desires for a 
harmful outcome. In all three studies participants 
condemned attempts to benefit from harm even 
when controlling for their judgments of the actor’s 
character, suggesting that negative evaluations of 
these acts do not simply reflect an indiscriminate 
willingness to condemn the actions of disliked 
individuals. In Study 4 we seek to provide further 
evidence of the independence of blame and 
character judgments. In particular we test whether 
people indiscriminately assign blame to any bet 
placed by an investor with a bad character, or 
instead selectively assign blame for the specific 
bets that lead individuals to adopt wicked desires. 
In order to do so, we modified the 
catastrophe bond scenario used in previous 
studies. As before, half of participants read about 
a fund manager’s decision to buy bonds that that 
become more valuable following a natural disaster 
(the bad manager), while half of participants read 
about the a fund manager’s decision to buy bonds 
that become less valuable following a natural 
disaster (the good manager). (We predicted that 
the first manager would be judged bad and the 
second manager judged good based on the 
consistent results of Studies 1-3.)  However, each 
scenario went on to describe those same managers 
later selling their bonds in order to have more cash 
on hand. Thus, each actor performs two actions: 
An initial investment in a catastrophe bond, and a 
subsequent divestment from that same bond. 
If people are simply inclined to condemn any 
actions of immoral individuals, they should rate 
both actions (buying and selling the bonds) to be 
more morally bad when performed by the morally 
bad manager compared to when those actions are 
performed by the morally good manager.  The 
initial investments would signal the moral 
character of the managers, and then information 
about moral character would subsequently 
influence the judgment of both the buying acts 
and the selling acts equally. 
Our wicked desires account, however, 
predicts that buying bonds that appreciate when 
harm occurs will be judged a morally bad action, 
but subsequently selling those bonds will not be 
judged a morally bad action (even though the 
actor remains the same and character is therefore 
held constant).  In other words, being a morally 
bad manager will not be sufficient to taint any 
transaction involving a catastrophe bond.  Only 
those specific actions that adopt a wicked desire 
will be judged morally wrong. 
 
Participants and Design 
 
The study was administered online to 145 U.S. 
adults (87 female; ages 18-74; Mage = 35, SDage = 
12.36), who were recruited and paid via 
Amazon.com’s Mechanical Turk web service 
(Paolacci, Chandler, & Ipeirotis, 2010). 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of 
four conditions in a 2 (investment: harm vs. no 
harm) x 2 (action: buy vs. sell) between-subjects 
design. All participants read about Mr. Green, “a 
money manager at a large financial firm,” who 
decides to invest one of his funds heavily in 
“catastrophe bonds.” In the harm condition, the 
bonds were described as “worth little unless a 
severe earthquake strikes a certain third world 
country in the next two years, in which case they 
gain value.” In the no harm condition, they were 
described as “worth little unless a certain third 
world country is NOT struck by an earthquake in 
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the next two years, in which case they gain value.” 
All participants then read that “the next day, Mr. 
Green’s firm unexpectedly has to make a large 
cash payment to a major shareholder,” and that 
“in order to come up with this cash, Mr. Green 
sells back the cat bonds he bought the day 
before.” All participants then completed the two 
character evaluation items used in the previous 
studies. 
Participants in the buy condition then saw a 
new page with the instruction to “consider Mr. 
Green’s decision to BUY the catastrophe bonds” 
and were asked to evaluate this decision using the 
same action evaluation items used in the previous 
studies (“Buying the catastrophe bonds was 
morally wrong”; “Mr. Green should be morally 
blamed for buying the catastrophe bonds”). 
Participants in the sell condition made the same 
judgments, but regarding Mr. Green’s decision to 
sell the bonds.  
 
Results and Discussion 
 
We first tested whether participants evaluated 
Mr. Green’s character more negatively in the harm 
condition. The two character items were highly 
correlated, r(145) = .87, p < .001, and were 
therefore combined into a composite. As 
expected, in the harm condition evaluations of Mr. 
Green’s character were more negative (M = 4.92) 
than in the no harm condition (M = 6.39), t(143) = 
5.05, p < .0001. Thus, our manipulation 
successfully affected evaluations of Mr. Green’s 
character.  
We next examined evaluations of Mr. Green’s 
actions. The two action evaluation items were 
highly correlated, r(145)  = .79, p < .001, and were 
combined into a composite measure of blame. 
Inspecting these composite scores revealed 
substantial positive skew (skewness = .755; 
kurtosis = -1.03) so non-parametric tests were 
used. A Kruskal-Wallis non-parametric ANOVA 
showed that blame differed significantly by 
condition, "2(3) = 8.36, p = .04. Follow up tests 
(Mann-Whitney U) showed that in the harm/buy 
condition—in which Mr. Green bought bonds 
that paid off in case of disaster—blame was 
significantly higher (M=4.58, SD=2.57) than in 
each of the other three conditions (Mharm/sell = 3.35, 
SD=2.32; Mno harm/buy  = 3.26, SD=2.37; Mno harm/sell = 
3.08, SD=1.85), all ps < .03. None of the other 
conditions differed significantly from each other, 
all ps > .60 (see Figure 2).2 Thus, these results 
support the wicked desires account, which 
predicts that only actions that position one to 
benefit from harm should elicit increased blame, 
over the indiscriminate condemnation account, which 
predicts that an agent who has demonstrated bad 
character by buying bonds that appreciate after 
disasters should also be blamed for subsequently 
selling them.  
The results of this study buttress the results of 
Studies 1-3: In those studies, statistically 
controlling for character judgments did not 
eliminate blame for attempts to benefit from 
harm. In the current study, we experimentally 
demonstrate a dissociation between judgments of 
blame and evaluations of character. Character 
evaluations were more negative when actors had 
attempted to benefit from harm, but only actions 
that positioned them to do so were seen as 
blameworthy. These results show that attempts to 
benefit from harm are seen as morally 
blameworthy independent of people’s negative 
evaluations of the beneficiary’s moral character. 
 
General Discussion 
 
Across four experiments we provided 
evidence that people judge an individual as 
blameworthy if he positions himself to benefit 
from harm—even if he has no control over 
whether the harm occurs. Moreover, we found 
that even mere attempts to benefit from harm 
were seen as blameworthy, both when they were 
unsuccessful (Study 2) and when no outcome 
information was available (Study 3). As predicted 
by our wicked desires account, moral disapproval 
of these acts was mediated by the assumptions 
about the individual’s underlying desires: 
Individuals benefitting from harm were seen as 
possessing a desire for the harm to occur, which 
in turn led to moral condemnation. However, this 
effect was eliminated if the benefit from harm 
functioned to offset another corresponding cost, 
such that the individual had no overall reason to 
prefer harm to non-harm (Study 3).  By changing 
participants’ perceptions of the desires likely to 
result from the individual’s behavior, this 
information eliminated blame for benefiting from 
harm. Blame for benefiting from harm was not 
merely the result of negative evaluations of the 
beneficiary’s character: In Studies 1-3, statistically 
controlling for negative evaluations of the 
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individual’s character did not eliminate blame for 
benefiting from harm. In Study 4, we found that 
character evaluations of individuals who had 
attempted to benefit from harm were more 
negative, but only actions that actually positioned 
them to do so were seen as blameworthy.  
These results are problematic for 
psychological theories of blame and responsibility 
which emphasize the presence of causal responsibility 
for harm and the intention to cause harm as 
necessary for the attribution of moral blame (e.g. 
Fincham & Shultz, 1981; Piaget, 1932; Shaver, 
1985; Weiner, 1995). We have suggested an 
alternative account—that participants assign moral 
blame even in the absence of causality and 
intentionality when the act in question requires the 
actor to adopt a wicked desire. In the current 
experiments, individuals who benefitted from 
harm chose to “root” for a bad outcome, and 
these desires were sufficient to trigger judgments 
of blame and bad character even when it was 
obvious that the individual had no causal control 
over the harm that occurred.  While the current 
studies do not contradict the weight of evidence 
demonstrating that causal responsibility for harm 
and intent to harm are sufficient to trigger moral 
condemnation, it provides evidence that they are 
not always necessary—adopting wicked desires 
would also appear sufficient.  
These findings appear more consistent with 
the theoretical approach of Tetlock and 
colleagues, who have proposed a sacred value 
protection model of moral judgment (SVPM; 
Tetlock, 2003; Tetlock et al., 2000), although even 
this approach cannot fully account for the current 
findings. The SVPM posits that people deem 
some values (e.g., preserving human life) to be 
“sacred,” and react with moral outrage when these 
values are “contaminated” by non-sacred concerns 
such as financial profit. For instance, in the 
scenarios we describe, it may be that merely 
contemplating a harmful outcome (especially in 
the context of financial decisions) might give rise 
to judgments of blameworthiness. Yet the SVPM 
cannot explain several core findings of our studies. 
For one, the contemplation of a harmful event 
alone does not appear sufficient to explain the 
difference in judgments for an actor who placed a 
bet for or against that event—both parties would 
be equally “guilty” of considering the event. More 
importantly, the SVPM would not predict that 
manipulating the perception of an actor’s desires 
would affect whether speculating on disasters was 
deemed blameworthy. Along the same lines, it 
would not predict differing moral evaluations of 
buying vs. selling financial instruments that allow 
one to profit from a natural disaster. All of these 
behaviors can, in an important way, be seen as 
contaminating the “sacred” domain of human life 
with financial speculation. Finally, the SVPM 
would have difficulty explaining negative moral 
evaluations when the sacred domain does not 
enter the picture (such as the study in which an 
agent is judged to be blameworthy for “shorting” 
a stock to make a profit), since monetary profit or 
loss is not held as a sacred moral value. Thus, 
while our data do not contradict the SVPM, it 
cannot explain the core pattern of results that 
motivates the wicked desires account. 
 
Implications for a character-based account of moral 
judgment 
 
Having demonstrated that moral assessments 
do track wicked desires, we now turn to a more 
fundamental question: Why?  Our results are 
consistent with recent suggestions that moral 
evaluations of acts often depend on what these 
acts imply about the actor’s character (Pizarro & 
Tanenbaum, in press; Pizarro & Helzer, in press).  
Put simply, one way that people appear answer the 
question “was that action wrong?” is to ask the 
question, “could only a bad person have done it?” 
Consider several examples.  One recent study 
shows that people tend to judge a difficult moral 
decision (e.g., whether to deny an expensive organ 
transplant to a needy patient) more harshly if it is 
made quickly and without qualms, as compared to 
slowly and with much deliberation (Critcher, 
Inbar, & Pizarro, 2011). People seem to reason 
that only a bad person could make such a decision 
without hesitation or conflict, and this leads them 
to judge the action blameworthy.   Another recent 
study showed that people consider it worse to fire 
a small fraction of employees of one race than to 
fire a full complement of employees comprising 
several races—even though the latter action harms 
every person the former action does and many 
more to boot (Uhlmann, Tannenbaum, & 
Diermier, in press).  People seem to reason that 
only a bad person would single out and fire 
employees of one race, and this leads them to 
judge the (quantitatively) less harmful action to be 
more blameworthy.  Similarly, in the present study 
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people may reason, “only a bad person could be 
comfortable adopting the desire harm to others,” 
and therefore conclude that betting on harm is 
wrong.  
This model may generalize to a host of other 
behaviors.  For example, imagine someone who 
sticks pins into a voodoo doll representing a rival 
(without any belief, of course, that this will 
actually work), or someone who mutilates pictures 
of his or her ex-boyfriend or ex-girlfriend. We 
suspect that people would conclude that only a 
bad person could perform these actions because 
of the desires that they require the agent to adopt.  
Thus, the actions themselves might be judged 
morally wrong and blameworthy despite the full 
knowledge that they could not possibly cause 
harm. Similarly, people’s willingness to condemn 
symbolic offenses—such as cleaning one’s toilet 
with the national flag (Haidt, Koller, & Dias, 
1993)—may be due at least in part to the negative 
character inferences that these actions are taken to 
support. 
While the above-mentioned examples (like 
many hypothetical stimuli employed in the study 
of moral judgment) are both uncommon and 
somewhat artificial, financial instruments allowing 
one to benefit from harm are common and widely 
accepted among financial professionals. For 
example, “life settlement-backed securities”—or, 
more bluntly, “death bonds”—allow people 
holding life insurance to sell their policies to 
investors, who pay the premiums and then collect 
the payout when the policy-holder dies. Major 
investment banks have recently discovered that 
these policies can be pooled, converted into 
bonds, and sold to institutional investors as 
pensions and mutual funds (Goldstein, 2007). We 
have suggested one reason that people find these 
kinds of financial instruments objectionable, and 
we believe that their designers and purchasers may 
do well to keep the widespread aversion to 
benefiting from harm in mind. 
Although further research is required before 
we fully understand how inferences about 
character shape the moral evaluation of actions, 
the first step may be to adjust descriptive theories 
of moral judgment to account for the growing 
evidence that people judge acts not only the basis 
of local intentions and outcomes, but also on the 
basis of how those actions shape an individuals’ 
desires, and what they imply about the actor’s 
moral character. We believe that this approach not 
only explains results that might otherwise be 
regarded as performance errors or anomalies, but 
also provides a fuller and more accurate picture of 
people’s real-world moral judgments.   
 
Footnotes 
 
1. In order to minimize length, we did not collect 
demographic information in Studies 1 and 3, 
although we did use Amazon.com’s respondent 
selection tools to restrict our studies to U.S. 
adults. When we did collect demographics in 
Study 2, we found that gender and age (57% 
female; M age = 35) were remarkably close to 
those reported by Paolacci, Chandler, & Ipeirotis 
(2010) for a sample of 1,000 Mechanical Turk 
workers collected in early 2010 (64.85% female, M 
age = 36). As Paolacci, Chandler, & Ipeirotis point 
out, although this population is younger and 
(obviously) more female than the U.S. population 
as a whole, it is nevertheless a good deal more 
representative of the population than are the 
undergraduate subject pools often used in 
psychological research. 
 
2. Using a conventional (i.e., parametric) 2 x 2 
ANOVA, the omnibus interaction test was not 
significant, F(1, 141)=1.85, p=.18. This was true 
even after the data were log-transformed, F(1, 
141)=2.63, p=.11. However, as Bobko (1986) 
shows, omnibus interaction tests in ANOVA lack 
power when—as in the current study—an ordinal 
interaction is expected (that is, when one cell is 
expected to differ from all others). Following 
Bobko’s two-step procedure for testing ordinal 
interactions showed that blame in the harm/sell, no 
harm/sell, and no harm/buy conditions did not 
differ, F(2, 105)=.14, p=.87; and that blame was 
higher in the harm/buy condition than in the other 
three conditions, planned contrast F(1, 141) = 
9.42, p = .003. 
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Figure 1. Blameworthiness of Mr. Green’s behavior (left panel) and perceived desires (right panel) by investment and profit condition. Higher values 
reflect greater blame and greater perceived desires for the harmful event. Error bars are 95% confidence intervals.
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Figure 2. Blameworthiness of Mr. Green’s behavior (left panel) and evaluations of his character (right panel) by investment and action condition. Higher 
bars in the left panel reflect greater blame; higher bars in the right panel reflect more positive character judgments. Error bars are 95% confidence 
intervals. 
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Appendix A 
 
Harm/contingent profit: 
Mr. Green is a money manager at a large financial firm. He decides to invest one of his funds heavily in 
catastrophe bonds, or “cat bonds.” These bonds are worth little unless a severe hurricane strikes a certain 
third world country in the next two years, in which case they gain value. So Mr. Green’s firm makes money 
only if a hurricane strikes the third world country. 
 
No harm/contingent profit: 
Mr. Green is a money manager at a large financial firm. He decides to invest one of his funds heavily in 
catastrophe bonds, or “cat bonds.” These bonds gain value as long as a certain third world country is NOT 
struck by a hurricane in the next two years. So Mr. Green’s firm makes money only if a hurricane does NOT 
strike the third world country. 
 
Harm/non-contingent profit: 
Mr. Green is a money manager at a large financial firm. He discovers that many of his firm's investments in a 
certain third world country would lose a great deal of value if a severe hurricane were to strike in the next two 
years. In order to protect the firm against this, he decides to invest one of his funds heavily in catastrophe 
bonds, or “cat bonds.” These bonds are worth little unless a severe hurricane strikes the third world country 
in the next two years, in which case they gain value. So whether Mr. Green’s firm makes money is not 
affected by whether a hurricane strikes the third world country. 
 
No harm/non-contingent profit 
Mr. Green is a money manager at a large financial firm. He discovers that many of his firm's investments in a 
certain third world country will lose a great deal of value UNLESS a severe hurricane were to strike in the 
next two years. In order to protect the firm against this, he decides to invest one of his funds heavily in 
catastrophe bonds, or “cat bonds.” These bonds gain value as long as the third world country is NOT struck 
by a hurricane in the next two years. So whether Mr. Green’s firm makes money is not affected by whether a 
hurricane strikes the third world country. 
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